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Dear Editor:
El Salvador, if one may judge by press reports in this country in the past
year, is now characterized by a disregard for the rule of law and human
rights, to which no one can be indifferent. Particularly disturbing is the
death of four American religious women in El Salvador on December 2,
1980. It has been widely reported that these women were raped and killed
at the hands of the Salvadoran military. There are claims that 10,000 per-
sons this calendar year alone have been arrested without formal charges
being placed against them, tortured, abused and executed without trial or
any other legal process; that these are not random, lawless acts of individual
officials, but part of a systematic program of intimidation carried on with
official approval and supported by American foreign aid. Archbishop
Oscar Romero, for example, who spoke out in defense of human rights and
on behalf of social demands, was murdered while celebrating mass on
March 23, 1980, only about one month after he wrote to President Carter to
halt military aid which he claimed was being used to repress the populace,
Press accounts do not always agree. For example, a front-page article in
today's Wall Street Journal [Dec. 23, 1980] quotes unnamed advisors of the
president-elect as saying "There isn't any proof of government complicity
in the killings" of the American women, and the mother of one of the vic-
tims, Mrs. Donovan, is quoted by the Associated Press as saying there is no
doubt in her mind that the military killed her daughter, that "anyone who
goes to help the people of El Salvador is political, even though they are just
giving them the bare necessities of life. She was very political. She fed the
hungry, clothed the naked, housed people that didn't have homes."
As lawyers, we are trained to recognize when a dispute is essentially fac-
tual and how to assess evidence. On December 21, 1980, at Holy Name
Cathedral in Chicago, I heard two young men speak about conditions in El
Salvador. One described his brother's arrest and the subsequent discovery
of his mutilated body. Another described the arrest of his father, a minor
union leader, who was taken to jail, tortured and killed. Although this "tes-
timony" was moving, a lawyer could not help notice it was not under oath
or subject to cross-examination.
We lawyers immediately recognize that compared to testimony under
oath, subject to cross-examination, which bears strong indicia of reliability,
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press reports are not very satisfactory as evidence. But lawyers easily forget
that what is obvious to us is not obvious to lay persons, many of whom
"believe" what they read in the newspaper. My son, Steven, who has been
helping me research the situation in El Salvador by reading news accounts,
came across the following New York Times' article, dated October 11, 1980,
which is illustrative of the factual problems:
Official of a Governing Party Is
Slain in El Salvador
Leftist guerillas assassinated the chief spokesman for the Christian Democratic
Party in an ambush today near his home in the capitol, a witness said.
A leftist guerilla group, Popular Liberation Forces, was responsible for the
slaying, the witness said. The claim was not immediately verified. Members of
the group announced that they killed the South African ambassador to El Salva-
dor, Archibald Dunn, yesterday.
Melvin Rigoberto Orellana, the Christian Democratic spokesman, was the
national information secretary for his party, which has two members on the gov-
erning military-civilian junta.
The main source of the story is not identified and the story is not con-
firmed. This newspaper article has considerable value, for it is the only
evidence available. As a political matter, it is critically important whether it
was "leftists," "rightists," or some other political group who carried out the
"assassination." But given the serious nature of the alleged human rights
violations in El Salvador, particularly with regard to American citizens, we
must have better evidence if, as the Rule of Law requires, criminals are to
be brought to justice regardless of "politics."
For this reason, on December 15, 1980, I wrote to the Honorable Niall
Macdermot, Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists,
and encouraged the International Commission of Jurists to undertake a
study of the present situation regarding the Rule of Law in El Salvador. I
told Secretary-General Macdermot I was sure many other American law-
yers shared my view that a study of present conditions in El Salvador
should be encouraged and supported. I also sent a copy of this letter to you,
as an ex officio member of the Section on International Law of the Ameri-
can Bar Association, with the request that you bring this matter to the
attention of the American Bar Association.
The International Commission of Jurists is a nongovernmental organiza-
tion devoted to promoting understanding and observance of the Rule of
Law throughout the world. It has consultative status with the United
Nations Economic and Social Council and the Council of Europe and con-
ducts studies and inquiries into particular situations or subjects concerning
the Rule of Law and publishes reports about them to obtain legal protection
of human rights throughout the world. Of particular significance is a study
of the Rule of Law in Cuba published by the Commission in 1962. This
study, based on the reports of many eyewitnesses, documented the legal
system of Cuba in practice during and shortly after the rise to power of
Fidel Castro.
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I do not know what difficulties of time and money may stand in the way
of an inquiry by the International Commission of Jurists into the present
situation in El Salvador, but I hope that the Section on International Law
will be able to consider the matter. While I believe the status of the Inter-
national Commission of Jurists as an impartial international body devoted
to the Rule of Law uniquely qualifies it for this role, there may be much
that the Section on International Law itself could also do.
For example, what rights, if any, do the families of the murdered Ameri-
can women have if, as they apparently believe, Salvadoran officials have
tortured and killed these American citizens? What rights do persons who
were subjected to torture and other deprivations of human rights, who are
resident aliens in this country, have to right the wrongs allegedly done to
them, or to their relatives? In this regard, the Section may want to consider
the significance of a recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals
in which Judge Kaufman held that Paraguayans who had applied for per-
manent political asylum in the United States could bring an action in the
federal courts of this country against another citizen of Paraguay who was
served with summons while visiting the United States for wrongfully caus-
ing the death, by torture, of their son. Deliberate torture carried out under
the color of official authority, the court held, violates universally accepted
norms of the international law of human rights and is actionable.*
There was a time, and not so long ago, when this country would have
considered going to war if an American businessman was murdered or
American property expropriated. That we do not seriously consider mili-
tary action in these times when innocent American women are tortured and
murdered-albeit "allegedly"-is considered progress, and properly so,
precisely because we depend, as a civilized country, for vindication of these
wrongs on the principles of international law set forth in the law of nations,
to which we, along with most other nations, subscribe. For the Rule of Law
has replaced the rule of force. Happily, as lawyers, we see in these words
not merely a meaningless phrase, but a significant body of law which our
profession uniquely suits us to make effective in these difficult times.
Sincerely,
ARTHUR R. MATTHEWS, JR.
Chicago, IL
cc: Niall Macdermot, Secretary-General
International Commission of Jurists
*Filartiga v. Pefta-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Dear Editor:
The International Lawyer carried an article some time ago I which pro-
vided its readers with "An American View of the Common Market's Pro-
posed Group Exemption for Patent Licenses." Unfortunately, this article,
although written by two distinguished United States lawyers 2 respected in
the domestic antitrust arena, has confused the issue of patent licensing
agreements in the European Common Market (EEC) more than it has
helped the reader understand what is currently under consideration in the
EEC in this respect. Messrs. Handler and Blechman have, in effect, created
the impression that the Commission of the European Communities in Brus-
sels is out to drastically change the law of the Common Market as it applies
to patent licensing agreements. The reader must have come to the conclu-
sion, as the two authors of the article themselves most likely have, that
European attorneys are about to eliminate common legal and economic
sense from the area of patent licensing, and dismantle any future coopera-
tion among United States and other foreign companies and EEC firms as
regards technology transfers.
Nothing is further from the truth. This response was written with the
specific intention to set the record straight in this respect, to show, in other
words, that nothing will change, in substance, in the interpretation of EEC
antitrust law as it relates to industrial property rights, in general, and pat-
ents, in particular. Apart from that, the following comments will hopefully
help to correct the possible view among readers of the Handler-Blechman
article that Common Market lawyers are a bunch of ax-swinging fools
determined to discourage United States companies from licensing their pat-
ented inventions or secret know-how in Europe.3 Therefore, the remarks
below are confined to the analysis, and the conclusions, in the Handler-
Blechman article that extend to EEC law, generally, and the proposed
group exemption regulation, specifically.
In light of the continuous assertions throughout the article that the pro-
posed EEC regulation "condemns" certain licensing agreements, "prohib-
its" certain restrictions and "proscribe[s]" others, 4 thereby departing
"radically both from the law that has evolved in the United States and from
worldwide commercial practice,"5 the following clarification must be made
at the outset. The Commission Proposal for a Regulation on the Applica-
tion of Article 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome to Certain Categories of Patent
Licensing Agreements 6 does not condemn, prohibit or proscribe anything.
With just a glance over the language of the proposed regulation the reader
can quickly convince himself, as the authors of the criticized article could
'14 INT'L LAW. 403 (1980).
2Milton Handler and Michael D. Blechman.
'Supra note 1, at 408 and 428.
41d. at 410, 416, 421, 423 and 425, respectively.
'Id. at 428.
'O.J. Eur. Comm., No. C58, March 3, 1979, at 12; C.M.R. (CCH) 1 10,118.
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have done, that Article 3 of the proposed regulation merely excludes from
the benefit of group exemption certain agreements which contain clauses
listed there. This means nothing more, and nothing less, than the continued
necessity for such agreements to be notified to the Commission in Brussels
for individual exemption pursuant to Article 85(3), Treaty of Rome. In
other words, for these agreements nothing will change from today's situa-
tion. Others, mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 of the proposed regulation, will
automatically be exempted from the prohibition contained in Article 85(1). 7
The proposed group exemption regulation would not, in any way, change
the law as it exists today in the EEC with respect to patent licensing. To the
contrary, it clarifies this law, as it has evolved in the decisions of the Com-
mission and the judgments of the European Court of Justice over the past
thirteen years, and it simplifies enormously the procedure in respect of
exemptions for certain contract clauses which may be required.8 And there
is no indication that the Commission might change its approach, by now
well established, and reject individual applications for exemption under
Article 85(3) where in the past it has seen fit to approve them. In fact, many
of the clauses which Messrs. Handler and Blechman assert would be "pro-
hibited" in future EEC law, are prohibited today by Article 85(1), as inter-
preted by the Commission and the Court, but have been exempted on
several occasions. This is particularly true of territorial restrictions, as will
be shown. There is nothing that suggests that this will change once the
proposed regulation has been adopted.
To corroborate the statements made so far and in order to illuminate to
readers the application mechanism of EEC competition rules laid down in
Article 85, Treaty of Rome, something which the Handler-Blechman article
failed to do,9 a short digression into early EEC antitrust law seems in place.
7Article 85(1), Treaty of Rome, prohibits agreements between undertakings, decisions by
associations of undertakings and concerted practices (not "concentrated" practices as stated in
footnote 2 of the Handler-Blechman article) which may affect trade between Member States
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition
within the Common Market.
'Article 85(3), Treaty of Rome, which represents a kind of built-in rule of reason in EEC
antitrust law, allows the individual exemption from Article 85(1) of agreements, decisions and
concerted practices of the type mentioned in subparagraph (1) if they contribute to the
improvement of the production or distribution of goods or promote technical or economic
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits, and if they do not (a)
impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attain-
ment of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competi-
tion in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
'With the exception of one short half-sentence, interjected at the beginning of the article, the
authors did not explain that the possibility for an individual exemption of a particular licens-
ing agreement under Article 85(3) exists in almost all cases. Nowhere did the authors state that
the proposed group exemption regulation has no bearing whatsoever on the question whether
such exemption can be granted in a specific case, but simply addresses the problem whether or
not such an exemption can be automatic. This has the result, in this author's opinion, that the
readers of the Handler-Blechman article were misled as to the effects of the proposed regula-
tion, be:cause not everyone can be assumed to know about the interplay of Article 85(1) and
Article 85(3) in EEC antitrust law.
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During the first years of application of Articles 85 and 86, Treaty of Rome,
and after the adoption of Regulation 17/62, the Commission was swamped
with thousands of notifications from companies seeking exemption of their
agreements from the prohibitions of EEC competition rules. In order to
facilitate the administrative tasks of the Commission it appeared desirable
to enable the Commission to declare by way of regulation that the provi-
sions of Article 85(1) do not apply to certain categories of agreements; in
other words, to allow the Commission to grant a group or block exemption,
pursuant to Article 85(3). One such category of agreements which was felt
to qualify were exclusive dealing arrangements, as they can contribute to
improving the production and distribution of goods, in general. Therefore,
the EEC Council, in 1965, adopted Regulation 19/65 which gave the Com-
mission the desired power to apply Article 85(3) of the Treaty by regulation
to certain categories of bilateral exclusive dealing agreements.' 0 This
resulted in Regulation 67/67, issued by the Commission on March 22,
1967." This group exemption regulation did not change the law, as it stood
then in the Common Market, and it has worked well for all parties
involved. As a result of this regulation, all agreements of the type referred
to in Article 1, Regulation 67/67, and concluded after May 1, 1967 (the
effective date) were automatically exempt from Article 85, Treaty of Rome,
without prior registration. Others referred to in Article 3, which is of simi-
lar composition as Article 3 of the proposed regulation in the patent licens-
ing arena, continued to receive individual exemptions from the
Commission.' 2 As had been anticipated, the workload of the Commission
in this field decreased dramatically.' 3
The situation in the area of patent licensing today is what it used to be in
the area of exclusive dealing prior to the adoption of Regulation 67/67. At
year-end 1979, approximately two-thirds of all notifications and applica-
tions pending before the Commission related to patent licenses; the Com-
mission calls it a "problem of sheer bulk."' 4 Not surprisingly, the
Commission has therefore sought to equip itself with an equally effective
instrument as in the area of exclusive distribution agreements to master the
flood of applications for individual exemption of patent licensing agree-
ments. Regulation 19/65 of the EEC Council, which provided the legal
basis to enact Regulation 67/67, also contains sufficient authority for the
Commission to adopt a similar regulation granting a block exemption to
certain bilateral agreements "which include restrictions imposed in relation
'°O.J. EUR. COMM., No. 36, March 6, 1965, at 533; C.M.R. (CCH) 1 2717.
"O.J. EUR. COMM., No. 57, March 25, 1967, at 849; C.M.R. (CCH) 2727.
'
2To name just one of many: Commission Decision of December 23, 1977 in the case of
Campari; O.J. EUR. COMM. No. L 70, March 13, 1978 at 69; C.M.R. (CCH) 10,035.
3Of the 29,500 exclusive dealing agreements notified to the Commission during the early
years of application of EEC competition rules approximately 25,000 were settled on the basis
of Regulation 67/67; ef. NINTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITIES (CoMP. REP. EC 1979), point 2 (page 15/16).
4CoMp. REP. EC 1979, point 7 (page 20).
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to the acquisition or use of industrial property rights, in particular of pat-
ents, utility models, designs or trademarks" (Article l(1)(b), Regulation 19/
65). The Commission has worked on such a block exemption regulation for
patent licensing agreements for many years. After several futile attempts a
draft of such a regulation was finally published for discussion in 1979.15
This draft document indicates that the Commission intends to issue a
regulation for the block exemption of patent licensing agreements, which,
in its structure, will closely resemble Regulation 67/67. The practical
effects of this regulation (without going into any procedural detail) will be
twofold, once adopted. First, it will allow companies, in the majority of
cases, the immediate knowledge of whether or not their licensing agree-
ments will benefit from exemption; all bureaucratic delay will be excluded.
Legal certainty is the result. Second, the Commission will discharge itself
of one of its greatest administrative duties in the area of antitrust enforce-
ment, thereby automatically solving its "problem of sheer bulk." This will
result in increased efficiency and more productive allocation of resources on
the part of the EEC Administration. It can hardly be questioned, therefore,
that the purpose and the effect of the proposed regulation are positive, in
principle.
In view of this situation, the comments by Messrs. Handler and
Blechman, ascribing a negative function to the proposed regulation in that
it refuses, in Article 3, to extend automatic exemption to those agreements
that do not fall within its limits appear almost perverse. Their criticism,
while perhaps justified with respect to one or the other detail of the pro-
posed provisions in the regulation, is unfounded as far as the objective of
the Commission's proposal is concerned. The reader is reminded that the
exclusion of certain agreements from the block exemption, by virtue of
Article 3 in the current draft proposal, does not prejudice them in any way
as regards a single case, individual exemption. 16 They are eligible, or ineli-
gible for such an exemption under Article 85(3) regardless whether the reg-
ulation will ever be adopted. The only thing different in respect of
'"Supra, note 6. It is this draft which Handler-Blechman have made the subject matter of
their article mentioned supra, note 1.
6Provided they require such an exemption in the first place, because they contain prohibited
clauses which fall under Article 85(l). Nobody should make the mistake, however, to assume
that clauses that are not exempted are automatically prohibited. The Court of Justice, in Case
32/65, Italy v. EEC Council and EEC Commission, judgment of July 13, 1966, 12 Rec. 563
(1966); C.M.R. (CCH) 8048 had this to say in connection with an identical situation involv-
ing the group exemption of exclusive dealing agreements:
Under Article 87 of the Treaty, "the Council shall issue the necessary regulations or direc-
tives to put into effect the principles set forth in Articles 85 and 86." It is for the Council to
decide whether the adoption of a regulation is "necessary." The Council can find that such
is the case for a specific point and is not obligated to issue exhaustive rules encompassing the
entire field of application of Articles 85 and 86. It can therefore, if it considers it necessary,
declare an exemption pursuant to Article 85, paragraph 3, through a regulation. This does
not mean, however, that everything that is not exempt must be considered to be prohibited
(emphasis added).
Citation at 7717 in C.M.R. (CCH) 8048.
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agreements containing clauses that do not qualify for block exemption is
the requirement for the companies involved to notify the Commission sepa-
rately, and wait for an approval from Brussels. Thus, as was stated before,
nothing will change for this type of licensing agreement when and if the
proposed regulation is finally signed into law in the EEC.
Returning to the incorrect impression which the criticized article must
have created in the readers' minds as regards the change of law in the Com-
mon Market, purportedly resulting from an adoption of the proposed regu-
lation, the following observations are offered. Choosing territorial
restrictions, one of the seven topics of the Handler-Blechman article, as an
example, 17 the reader will be interested to learn that the European Court of
Justice ruled on four occasions on the subject of compatibility of industrial
property rights, which afford territorial protection under national laws, and
EEC competition rules before the Commission itself had to make a deter-
mination on a specific patent licensing agreement.' 8 In other words, the
Commission found a body of case law when it finally set out to make indi-
vidual decisions regarding the applicability of Article 85 to patent
licenses. 19
Generally speaking, the Court of Justice developed an approach which
was designed to reconcile the basic Community principle of free trade
across all intra-EEC borders with the protection of industrial property
rights granted by the laws of the Member States. This reconciliation was
based on a distinction between the existence of a property right, such as a
patent, and its exercise. The Court acknowledged the legal status granted
by the various Member State systems to a patent holder, thereby adhering
to the letter and spirit of Article 222, Treaty of Rome, 20 but at the same
time subjected the utilization of any industrial property right by means
other than the unilateral exercise of the right to the rules of competition,
laid down in the Treaty. As early as 1966, the Court held that "Articles 36,
222, and 234 of the Treaty. . . do not prevent Community law from having
"Here is not the time and place to go into any great detail as to the current status of EEC
law pertaining to patent licenses; this task must be left for another occasion. As was stated at
the outset, this article was written with the specific intention to correct the faulty impression
which the previous article in this Journal on the same subject must have created.
"Grundig, Consten v. EEC Commission; Cases 56 and 58/64, judgment of July 13, 1966, 12
Rec. 429 (1966), C.M.R. (CCH) 8046; Parke, Davis & Co. v. Centrafarm; Case 24/67, judg-
ment of February 29, 1968, 14 Rec. 81 (1968), C.M.R. (CCH) 8054; Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda
GmbH; Case 40/70, judgment of February 18, 1971, 17 Rec. 69 (1971), C.M.R. (CCH) 8101;
Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte; Case 78/70, judgment
of June 8, 1971; 17 Rec. 487 (1971); C.M.R. (CCH) 8106. The Commission's first patent
licensing decision came in the twin cases of Burroughs-Delplanque and Burroughs/Geha-
Werke, decisions of December 22, 1971, O.J. COMM. No. L 13, January 17, 1972, at 50 and 53,
respectively; C.M.R. (CCH) 9485 and 9486.
19The earlier attempt to define this problem in its famous "Christmas Message" of 1962
(Official Notice of the Commission of 24 December 1962, O.J. EUR. COMM., No. 139, at 2922)
is deliberately excluded from discussion, as this Commission Notice must be regarded as over-
ruled by later decisions; the text of that Notice is reproduced in C.M.R. (CCH) 2698.
2This Treaty provision leaves the systems of property ownership existing in the Member
States untouched.
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an influence on the exercise of industrial property rights under domestic
law,"' 2 1 and less than two years later the Court specified this position with
respect to patent rights by holding that "the provisions of Article 85 could
be applicable if the utilization of one or more patents by enterprises acting
in concert were to result in creating a situation likely to fall within the con-
cepts of agreements between enterprises . . . within the meaning of Article
85, paragraph 1.' ' 22 Consequently, the Court required in another case,
related to the contractual exercise of a trademark right in 1971, that "it
must be determined in each case whether the exercise of such right leads to
a situation that would come within the prohibition of Article 85."23 And
shortly thereafter, the Court concluded that the exercise of an industrial
property right (this time, the right under consideration was a type of copy-
right existing under German law) could fall under Article 85 (1) "wherever
it appears to be the object, the means, or the result of an agreement," 24
adding the rationale for all its decisions by stating that any other determi-
nation would conflict "with the essential goal of the Treaty, which is to
merge the national markets into a single market."
25
The Commission is bound by the interpretation of EEC law which the
Court of Justice provides. When it had to decide, in December 1971, its
first case involving a patent licensing agreement which provided territorial
protection for the licensees, it therefore faced a situation which may be
paraphrased as follows: The existence of an industrial property right,
untouched by EEC law, provides the right to its owner to restrict competi-
tion unilaterally, but where the exercise of the right involves a contractual
arrangement with another person or company no such restriction of compe-
tition will be allowed. 26 Thus, it can have surprised nobody when the Com-
mission stated in respect of an exclusive patent license with resulting
territorial restrictions that such licenses may, in some cases, restrict compe-
tition and come within the prohibition of Article 85(l).27 In the situation at
hand, the licensees of the Burroughs Corp. in France and Germany occu-
pied "only a small share" of their respective home markets for the products
2 Grundig, Consten, supra note 18, at 7654 in C.M.R. CCH 8046.
22Parke, Davis, supra note 18, at 7825 in C.M.R. CCH 8054.
I3Sirena, supra note 18, at 7112 in C.M.R. CCH 8101.2 Deutsche Grammophon, supra note 18, at 7192 in C.M.R. CCH 8106.
251d.
2 Cf. the similar view expressed in SMIT & HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN Eco-
NOMIC COMMUNiTY, A COMMENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY § 85.66 (Mathew Bender, New
York 1976).
"Decision of December 22, 1971, O.J. EUR. COMM., No. L 13, at 50, Jan. 17, 1972 (Bur-
roughs-Delplanque); C.M.R. CCH 9845, and decision of same date, O.J. EUR. COMM., No.
L 13, at 53, Jan. 17, 1972 (Burroughs/Geha-Werke); C.M.R. CCH 9846.
The relevant portion of both decisions in this respect reads as follows:
The holder of the patent may transfer the use of the rights flowing from his patent by grant-
ing licenses for a particular territory. Where he agrees, however, to limit the exploitation of
his exclusive right to a single enterprise in a territory and thus confers on that one enterprise
the right to exploit the invention and to prevent other enterprises from using it, the holder of
the patent loses the opportunity to enter into agreements with other applicants for licenses.
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in question. Therefore, the Commission did not find a restriction of compe-
tition in the territorial restrictions resulting from the exclusive licenses
granted by Burroughs. A negative clearance was granted for both agree-
ments, pursuant to Article 2, Regulation 17/62.28
In later cases, however, the Commission did find contractually created
restrictions of competition where a patent holder granted its licensee an
exclusive license to manufacture and sell, with inherent territorial restric-
tions. In these cases, the market shares held by the licensees were substan-
tial. The Commission concluded that Article 85(1) was applicable and that
the territorial restrictions in respect of the exclusive rights were prohibited
by EEC law. Nevertheless, both in Davidson Rubber and in Kabelmetal-
Luchaire, an exemption was granted to the licensing agreements under
Article 85(3).29 The Commission found all the prerequisites of that subsec-
tion existent in both cases. The common element was the fact that the
licensees could not have been expected to make the required investments,
necessary to penetrate new markets, without the protection of exclusivity.
As the Commission itself stated in a later decision, Article 85(1) may be
declared inapplicable in cases of patent licenses containing territorial
restrictions, in particular "when the exclusivity provides a stimulus for the
licensee to penetrate a territorial, or product, market which has not yet been
exploited by the licensor." 30 In no case so far was the market share held by
either the licensor or the licensee a stumbling block, preventing the exemp-
tion under Article 85(3). Luchaire S.A. had approximately 20 percent of
the French market for which it received an exclusive license from
Kabelmetal, a subsidiary of a multi-billion DM enterprise in Germany; the
relevant market was that of mechanical-engineering parts for the automo-
bile industry and electrical industry, in particular. And the European licen-
sees of the United States firm Davidson Rubber had a combined share of
one-third of the relevant EEC market for automobile armrests.
There is nothing that suggests that these cases would have been decided
differently had the current draft proposal for a group exemption regulation
already been adopted in the Common Market when the Commission
granted the exemptions to Davidson Rubber and later to Kabelmetal-
In some cases an exclusive manufacturing license may therefore restrict competition and
come within the prohibition of Article 85, paragraph 1.
Supra, at 9041 (C.M.R., CCH 9485), Deiplanque; and at 9044 (C.M.R., CCH 9486), Geha-
Werke.
2 This provision in the Council's EEC antitrust enforcement regulation reads as follows:
"Upon application by undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned, the Commis-
sion may certify that, on the basis of the facts in its possession, there are no grounds under
Article 85(I) or Article 86 of the Treaty for action on its part in respect of an agreement,
decision, or practice."
Cf Davidson Rubber Co., Commission Decision of June 9, 1972, O.J. EUR. COMM., No. L
143, at 31, June 23, 1972; C.M.R. (CCH) 9512; and Kabelmetal-Kuchaire, Commission Deci-
sion of July 18, 1975, O.J. EUR. COMM., No. L 222, at 34, August 22, 1975, C.M.R. (CCH)
9761.
-°AOIP/Beyrard, Commission Decision of December 2, 1975, O.J. EUR. COMM., No. L 6, at
8, Jan. 13, 1976, C.M.R. (CCH) 1 9801, at 9793-9.
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Luchaire. The territorial restrictions in the agreements might have pre-
vented the automatic exemption under the regulation, but Article 85(3)
would have provided a basis for an individual exemption as it has in many
other cases where the turnover limits currently envisaged by Article 1 of the
draft proposal were exceeded. 3 1 Messrs. Handler and Blechman have over-
looked the fact that EEC law, as regards contractually created territorial
restrictions in patent licensing agreements within the Common Market, has
been settled for many years; nothing will change in this respect when the
proposed group exemption regulation is finally adopted. Following the gui-
dance provided by earlier Court judgments, the Commission has held these
territorial restrictions consistently to violate Article 85(1), save for excep-
tional circumstances. However, at the same time it has been able, given the
appropriate situation, to grant individual exemptions from the prohibition
of Article 85(1) to many companies, including large-size US multinationals.
The American legal profession should rest assured that this situation will
continue after the group exemption regulation has become law in the EEC.
And for many companies, including United States firms, life in this respect




I was delighted to receive the Summer 1980 issue of The International
Lawyer with my article on the Moon Treaty. Through my own error I find
that one statement contained in footnote 198 at p. 483 is not factual, namely
the entry into force of the Agreement. I would like to suggest that the next
issue of The International Lawyer note that the second sentence of the foot-
note should read: "By January 1, 1981 the treaty had been signed by Chile,
France, Romania, The Philippines, Austria, Morroco, and Guatemala."
Sincerely yours,
CARL Q. CHRISTOL
Professor of International Law
and Political Science
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
3 tCf.,for example, in the related area ofjoint ventures the exemptions granted to Bayer A.G.
of Germany and Gist-Brocades of Holland, Commission Decision of December 15, 1975, O.J.
EUR. COMM., No. L 30, at 13, February 5, 1976, C.M.R. (CCH) 9814; or to Beecham Group
Ltd. of England and Parke, Davis and Co. of USA, Commission Decision of January 17, 1979,
O.J. EUR. COMM., No. L 70, at 11, March 21, 1979, C.M.R. (CCH) 10,121. The turnover
limits set by Article 1, Draft Proposal, are exceeded by far by all these companies.

